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INTRODUCTION 
In March 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court dealt a blow to the 
biotechnology industry, issuing a decision that will render many methods of 
medical diagnosis unpatentable. In Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus 
Laboratories, Inc., the Court invalidated patents on a method to determine 
the appropriate dosage level of the drug thiopurine, which is used to treat 
autoimmune diseases.1 This method, in the Court’s view, did nothing more 
than apply an unpatentable law of nature, the correlation between 
thiopurine levels in the bloodstream and the drug’s efficacy, in a manner 
that was well-understood by doctors.2 The Court reasoned that allowing 
exclusive rights over this method would “inhibit future innovation premised 
upon [it],” such as investigations into the underlying diseases or improved 
methods of treating them.3 To support its analysis, the Court twice cited 
Creation Without Restraint,4 the recent, pathbreaking book by Christina 
Bohannan5 and Herbert Hovenkamp.6 
As the Supreme Court’s recently heightened interest in patent law 
illustrates,7 there is widespread belief that intellectual property (“IP”) law is 
in crisis. Common critiques of patent law are that the Patent and Trademark 
Office (“PTO”) grants too many patents, that these patents have poorly 
defined boundaries, and that patent litigation is too expensive and 
unpredictable. Patent law’s problems have inspired dozens of books,8 
exponentially more scholarly articles, and even an episode of NPR’s This 
American Life.9 Congress has also recognized that patent reform is needed, 
passing the America Invents Act,10 which is intended to “improve patent 
 
 1. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012).  
 2. Id. at 1297–98. 
 3. Id. at 1301. 
 4. Id. at 1302, 1305. 
 5. Christina Bohannan, Professor and Lauridsen Family Fellow in Law, University of Iowa 
College of Law. 
 6. Herbert Hovenkamp, Ben and Dorothy Willie Chair, University of Iowa College of 
Law. 
 7. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, What the Federal Circuit Can Learn from the Supreme Court—
and Vice Versa, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 787, 792–93 (2010). 
 8. In addition to Creation Without Restraint, notable examples include: JAMES BESSEN & 
MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT 
INNOVATORS AT RISK (2008); DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE 
COURTS CAN SOLVE IT (2009); MICHAEL A. CARRIER, INNOVATION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: 
HARNESSING THE POWER OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LAW (2009); ADAM B. 
JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS 
ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2004). 
 9. When Patents Attack, NPR (July 26, 2011, 3:00 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/ 
money/2011/07/26/138576167/when-patents-attack. 
 10. Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (to be 
codified in scattered sections of 28 and 35 U.S.C.).  
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quality and limit unnecessary and counterproductive litigation costs.”11 As 
for copyright law, the primary concern is interest-group capture of the 
legislative process by content owners (such as movie studios and record 
companies) at the expense of users (consumers, educators, and other 
artists), resulting in vast expansions of the rights and enforcement powers of 
copyright holders.12 
The core objective of Creation Without Restraint is to reorient IP law to its 
constitutional purpose: promoting innovation.13 To do this, the authors 
recommend, among other things, adopting an “IP injury” requirement in 
infringement litigation. Similar to the better-known antitrust injury 
requirement—which mandates that an antitrust plaintiff prove not just any 
injury, but an injury to competition14—the IP injury requirement would 
mandate that an infringement plaintiff prove an injury to the incentive to 
innovate (p. 51). 
An IP injury requirement is a commendable policy recommendation 
and, just as important, is easy to justify under governing law. But there is 
more to Bohannan and Hovenkamp’s argument. By reconceptualizing IP 
law with an eye toward its constitutional roots, the authors make a 
compelling case for related doctrinal reforms. They are not the first to 
identify the need for less ambiguous patent claims,15 for restrictions on the 
remedies available to patent holders who do not use the patented 
technology,16 and for shorter but renewable copyright terms.17 The 
fundamental contribution of Creation Without Restraint is that the authors’ 
expertise in both IP and antitrust yields novel, nuanced, and persuasive 
justifications for these and other proposals. In particular, antitrust-inspired 
proposals such as restricting the use of patents in networked markets and 
expanding the role of IP misuse doctrine are buttressed by sophisticated 
analyses showing how these changes to IP law can enhance competition, 
which, in turn, should promote innovation. 
This Review supplements the important contributions made by Creation 
Without Restraint by exploring a complementary approach to reforming IP 
law, and in particular patent law, that the book affords little attention. This 
 
 11. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 40 (2011). 
 12. See, e.g., JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 62–63 (2001). See generally ROBERT P. 
MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW 
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 667–78 (5th ed. 2010) (summarizing recent copyright legislation).  
 13. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 14. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).  
 15. See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 8, at 2–3. 
 16. See, e.g., eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 395 (2006) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring).  
 17. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A 
CONNECTED WORLD 251 (2001). 
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approach focuses on the institutions that engage with patent law, such as the 
courts and the PTO, and considers how institutional structure affects 
substantive law.18 Accordingly, this Review considers how the institutional 
design of the patent system might impede (or facilitate) adoption of the 
reforms recommended in Creation Without Restraint. Approaching the 
authors’ proposals from an institutional perspective can help determine 
which government body is best positioned to resolve the current IP crisis in 
the thoughtful ways suggested by their book. 
This Review proceeds in two parts. Part I summarizes the book’s 
descriptive insights and normative recommendations. It also describes how 
IP law could easily incorporate the authors’ innovation-centered approach. 
Indeed, many of their concerns are already reflected in recent Supreme 
Court decisions in the field of patent law. Part I concludes by engaging the 
IP injury proposal and questioning whether it will help courts resolve the 
most vexing problems in modern patent law. For example, under the 
authors’ approach, it is unclear whether the Supreme Court was correct in 
Prometheus when it invalidated patents on methods of medical diagnosis, 
even though the Court cited Creation Without Restraint to support its holding. 
Part II broadens the perspective of Creation Without Restraint by looking 
to the dynamic and growing literature on the institutional structure of the 
patent system. The Review considers how the institutions that mold patent 
law might limit the potential of the authors’ proposals. In particular, the 
presence of a semi-specialized court for patent appeals, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, might impede the reformative capability of 
the authors’ innovation-centered approach. However, other institutions, 
such as the Office of the Solicitor General, play a critical role in shaping 
patent law and may help bring Bohannan and Hovenkamp’s proposals into 
effect. 
I. IP INJURY 
This Part explains the authors’ fundamental arguments and, focusing 
on the IP injury requirement in particular, suggests that their proposal is a 
 
 18. See, e.g., Michael J. Burstein, Rules for Patents, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1747 (2011); 
Jeanne C. Fromer, Patentography, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1444 (2010); John M. Golden, The Supreme 
Court as “Prime Percolator”: A Prescription for Appellate Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. 
REV. 657 (2009); Paul R. Gugliuzza, Rethinking Federal Circuit Jurisdiction, 100 GEO. L.J. 1437 
(2012); Sapna Kumar, Expert Court, Expert Agency, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1547 (2011); Jonathan 
Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE L.J. 470 (2011); Joseph Scott Miller, Substance, Procedure, and 
the Divided Patent Power, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 31 (2011); Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, 
Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1619 (2007); Arti K. Rai, 
Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1035 (2003); Sarah Tran, Administrative Law, Patents, and Distorted Rules, 80 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 831 (2012); Liza Vertinsky, Comparing Alternative Institutional Paths to Patent Reform, 61 ALA. 
L. REV. 501 (2010); Melissa F. Wasserman, The PTO’s Asymmetric Incentives: Pressure To Expand 
Substantive Patent Law, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 379 (2011). 
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realistic solution that is actually reflected in some recent and important 
Supreme Court decisions. It also explores the potential limitations of the IP 
injury concept by using the example of patentable subject matter, perhaps 
the most vexing issue in patent law today. 
A. THE PROPOSAL 
Bohannan and Hovenkamp’s recommendations are based largely on 
the economic insights that “innovation contributes much more to economic 
progress than the simple creation and maintenance of competitive markets” 
and that the amount of economic competition is directly related to the 
amount of innovation (pp. xi–xii). Accordingly, the core concern of both IP 
and competition law should be, in the authors’ view, promoting innovation. 
The authors define innovation broadly, as “human idea[s] that add[] 
something important to what we already have” (p. ix). While Bohannan and 
Hovenkamp approach their task in a thoughtful and evenhanded fashion, 
they are clearly skeptical of the increasing propertization of ideas (see p. 
xiv). As a general matter, their reforms would limit the rights of IP owners 
and make it harder to obtain IP protection. 
The starting point for their analysis is the IP injury requirement, which 
would require infringement plaintiffs to prove injury to innovation 
incentives. Bohannan and Hovenkamp have introduced this concept in a 
prior article,19 and it provides a theoretical hook for more specific proposals 
that follow. The IP injury requirement is inspired by antitrust law’s antitrust 
injury requirement. As the authors explain, antitrust law once faced a 
situation similar to today’s crisis in IP law. By the early 1970s, the Supreme 
Court, largely at the behest of the executive branch, had condemned various 
practices that would today be considered pro-competitive (or at least 
competitively neutral), such as tying arrangements and mergers by firms 
with no market power (pp. 35–37).20 In general, this approach shielded 
businesses from price competition that would have benefitted consumers (p. 
35). This focus on the protection of particular firms, rather than on 
protection of competition generally, was heavily criticized by academic 
commentators, both from the Chicago School and the more centrist 
Harvard School (p. 38). 
These critiques bore fruit in 1977, when the Supreme Court, in a 
unanimous opinion by Justice Thurgood Marshall, imposed on private 
 
 19. See Christina Bohannan & Herbert Hovenkamp, IP and Antitrust: Reformation and Harm, 
51 B.C. L. REV. 905 (2010); see also Christina Bohannan, Copyright Harm, Foreseeability, and Fair 
Use, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 969, 970 (2007) (developing the concept of “copyright harm,” which 
would “limit[] infringement to foreseeable uses and other harmful uses that are likely to reduce 
ex ante incentives to create or distribute copyrighted works”). 
 20. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); Int’l Salt Co. v. United 
States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947), abrogated by Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 
(2006). 
B1_GUGLIUZZA.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/29/2012  1:42 PM 
752 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98:747 
antitrust plaintiffs a requirement that they demonstrate “antitrust injury” 
before recovering damages.21 The defendant in that case, Brunswick, was a 
leading supplier of bowling equipment, which it sold to alleys on credit.22 
When the bowling industry went into decline in the 1960s, many alleys 
defaulted on their equipment purchases.23 To collect on its debts, Brunswick 
began acquiring and operating those defaulting alleys.24 The plaintiffs in 
Brunswick operated bowling alleys in markets in which Brunswick had made 
acquisitions.25 The antitrust violation alleged was that the plaintiffs had lost 
profits because Brunswick prevented the defaulting alleys from closing.26 
The Supreme Court rejected the antitrust claim. Justice Marshall’s 
opinion emphasized—without any particular statutory or constitutional 
support—that “[t]he antitrust laws . . . were enacted for ‘the protection of 
competition, not competitors.’”27 To recover treble damages for antitrust 
violations, the Court concluded that plaintiffs “must prove antitrust injury, 
which is to say injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to 
prevent.”28 In other words, antitrust plaintiffs now had to prove that their 
claimed injury flowed from a loss of competition. Since the plaintiffs in 
Brunswick were arguing that they had been harmed due to the maintenance of 
competition (Brunswick’s acquisition and continued operation of the failing 
alleys), the plaintiffs could not recover damages. 
Bohannan and Hovenkamp’s IP injury proposal is similar to the 
antitrust injury requirement. It would refocus IP law on its fundamental 
purpose of promoting innovation, rather than protecting only individual 
property rights. In the authors’ view, “IP law should recognize harm only for 
[unauthorized] uses that are likely to interfere with IP holders’ decisions to 
create or distribute their works” (p. 51). This IP injury requirement 
measures incentives ex ante. So, an IP holder suffers IP injury when an 
infringer’s actions diminish returns “that are reasonably foreseeable at the 
time innovation occurs” (p. 56). 
The IP injury requirement would change patent law in many ways. For 
example, it suggests that patent law should be hesitant to allow infringement 
suits based on claims that were added to a patent application after it was 
submitted to the PTO, as it is unlikely (but not impossible) that those claims 
 
 21. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977); see also William 
H. Page, The Chicago School and the Evolution of Antitrust: Characterization, Antitrust Injury, and 
Evidentiary Sufficiency, 75 VA. L. REV. 1221, 1269–78 (1989) (discussing how the Chicago School 
influenced judicial adoption of the antitrust injury requirement). 
 22. Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 479. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 479–80. 
 25. Id. at 480. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 488 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 
294, 320 (1962)). 
 28. Id. at 489 (emphasis omitted). 
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provided an incentive to innovate in the first place (p. 53). Rather, an 
applicant might have added those claims specifically to cover technology 
that its competitors developed after the original application was filed (p. 
73). 
Like the antitrust injury requirement, the IP injury requirement might 
be viewed as a prerequisite for an infringement claim. But Bohannan and 
Hovenkamp also develop IP injury as a tool for constitutional and statutory 
interpretation (p. xiv). As a constitutional example from copyright law, 
consider Eldred v. Ashcroft29 and Golan v. Holder,30 cases in which the Supreme 
Court upheld under the Constitution’s IP Clause statutes that extended the 
duration of copyright protection on pre-existing works, including works that 
had already entered the public domain. An approach to constitutional 
interpretation focused on innovation incentives would have emphasized that 
the term extensions could not possibly have provided ex ante incentives for 
those works’ creation, and therefore did not “promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts,” as the Constitution requires.31 
As for statutory interpretation, Bohannan and Hovenkamp see this 
purposive approach as a tool to combat the interest-group capture that 
permeates recent copyright legislation. For example, the authors urge that 
“ambiguous statutes should be construed according to [any] stated public-
interest purpose” (p. 216). The legislative history of the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (“DMCA”),32 for instance, purports to balance the rights of 
copyright owners and users (pp. 217–18). Focusing on this supposed 
purpose could mediate some of the law’s more draconian provisions. For 
example, the DMCA prohibits the sale of devices that enable copying of 
encrypted works, like commercial DVDs.33 This provision plainly prevents 
some uses that would otherwise be permissible under copyright law’s fair use 
doctrine, such as copying short movie clips for educational purposes. 
(Imagine the Evidence professor who wishes to insert into his PowerPoint 
slides the expert testimony of Mona Lisa Vito from My Cousin Vinny.) A court 
applying the innovation-focused insights of IP injury could reason that the 
public benefit of that educational use trumps the rights of the copyright 
owner, who would likely suffer no lost sales due to use of the clip. 
B. A DOCTRINALLY REALISTIC SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS IN IP LAW 
Before considering possible critiques of Bohannan and Hovenkamp’s 
proposal, it is important to note that the IP injury requirement is well-
grounded in existing law. In fact, it is much easier to justify the IP injury 
 
 29. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
 30. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012). 
 31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 32. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998). 
 33. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b) (2006). 
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requirement under the patent and copyright laws than it is to justify the 
antitrust injury requirement under the Sherman Act (pp. 50–51). 
The Constitution explicitly states the purpose of the patent and 
copyright laws: “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”34 In 
other words, to promote innovation. The Sherman Act, by contrast, says 
nothing about its purpose. Section 1, for example, simply prohibits 
“contract[s] . . . in restraint of trade.”35 Further, Congress passed the 
Sherman Act under its constitutional power to “regulate Commerce . . . 
among the several States,”36 which tells us little about the law’s intended 
purpose. In fact, as Bohannan and Hovenkamp note, “[t]he history of the 
Sherman Act suggests that Congress may not have favored ‘competition’ or 
efficiency in the abstract, but rather the protection of small businesses that 
were threatened by large, aggressive low-cost rivals” (p. 4). Nevertheless, 
since it decided Brunswick in 1977, the Supreme Court has required private 
antitrust plaintiffs to prove that their claimed injury stems from impaired 
competition. 
Not only does the Constitution provide a justification for an IP injury 
requirement, the federal patent and copyright statutes are built for 
purposive interpretation. Although recent legislation has added length and 
complexity to both statutes (p. 44), relatively sparse provisions govern the 
most important requirements of patentability: patentable subject matter,37 
novelty,38 nonobviousness,39 and sufficient disclosure.40 And while copyright 
statutes like the DMCA contain very detailed provisions, malleable concepts 
like fair use provide courts with significant interpretative leeway.41 In these 
critical respects, the IP laws are similar to the Sherman Act, with its open-
ended prohibition on “restraint[s] of trade.”42 Sparse provisions give the 
courts leeway to develop, in the common-law tradition, judicial rules 
consistent with public policies underlying the relevant field of law.43 
 
 34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 35. 15 U.S.C. § 1. The statute’s broad prohibition further complicates the search for its 
purpose because “restraint is the very essence of every contract,” so, as the Supreme Court has 
noted, § 1 “cannot mean what it says.” Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 
679, 687–88 (1978) (emphasis added). 
 36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 37. 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
 38. Id. § 102. 
 39. Id. § 103(a). 
 40. Id. § 112. 
 41. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (statutory fair-use provision); see also Sony Corp. of Am. v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 447–48 (1984) (noting that § 107 “enable[s] a court 
to apply an ‘equitable rule of reason’ analysis to particular claims of infringement”). 
 42. 15 U.S.C. § 1. 
 43. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 544 (1983) (“The 
statute books are full of laws, of which the Sherman Act is a good example, that effectively 
authorize courts to create new lines of common law.”). 
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Most encouraging for those who hope to see Bohannan and 
Hovenkamp’s proposals adopted are some of the Supreme Court’s recent 
patent law decisions, which reflect concern about innovation incentives. 
Consider, for example, KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., which involved 
Teleflex’s patent on an automobile pedal with an electronic sensor.44 When 
sued for infringement, KSR argued that Teleflex’s patent was impermissibly 
obvious under the Patent Act because it simply combined already-known 
technology.45 On appeal, the Federal Circuit applied its “teaching, 
suggestion, or motivation” (“TSM”) test and rejected KSR’s obviousness 
argument.46 Under the TSM test, a patent could be proved obvious only if an 
explicit “teaching, suggestion, or motivation” to combine the known 
technology could be “found in the prior art” (such as issued patents and 
existing publications), “the nature of the problem, or the knowledge of a 
person [with] ordinary skill in the art.”47 
The Supreme Court reversed, rejecting the Federal Circuit’s rigid TSM 
analysis.48 Instead, the Court emphasized a more holistic approach that 
recognizes the importance of non-patent incentives—particularly market 
incentives—as a spur to innovation. Rather than looking strictly at published 
articles and issued patents, the Supreme Court instructed that an 
obviousness analysis should also consider “the effects of demands known to 
the design community or present in the marketplace,” among other factors, 
“to determine whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known 
elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue.”49 By attempting to 
limit patent protection to pathbreaking advancements, KSR, in theory, 
should reduce the expected costs of innovation by preventing infringement 
claims based on nominal improvements, such as Teleflex’s combination of 
an existing automobile pedal with a conventional electronic sensor. 
In addition to KSR, other recent Supreme Court patent decisions reflect 
concerns about whether the law is sufficiently protecting incentives to 
innovate. For example, in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., the Court 
rejected the Federal Circuit’s “general rule” that an adjudicated infringer 
will be enjoined from selling its product.50 Instead, the Court held that the 
 
 44. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). 
 45. Id. at 411–12; see 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (“A patent may not be obtained . . . if the 
differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the 
subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a 
person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.”). 
 46. KSR, 550 U.S. at 413–14. 
 47. Id. at 407. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 418. 
 50. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393–94 (2006). 
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usual equitable test for injunctive relief should apply.51 As opposed to the 
Federal Circuit’s presumption in favor of an injunction, this test allows lower 
courts more room to consider whether the requested remedy might harm 
the public’s interest in innovative (but infringing) products and services.52 
Likewise, in MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., the Court made it easier 
for patent licensees to bring declaratory judgment suits challenging the 
validity of the licensed patent.53 Specifically, the Court permitted licensees to 
challenge patent validity even if they had not yet breached the license 
agreement.54 This decision should encourage licensees to more actively 
challenge patents of questionable validity and result in the invalidation of 
more patents that would otherwise drag on innovation (p. 63). 
Following the Supreme Court’s lead, lower courts have also begun to 
more closely scrutinize the alleged harm underlying patent infringement 
claims. One notable example is Judge Posner’s recent opinion in Apple, Inc. 
v. Motorola, Inc.55 Sitting by designation on the district court, Judge Posner 
dismissed both parties’ infringement claims because neither party could 
prove entitlement to damages or an injunction.56 In reasoning that echoes 
Bohannan and Hovenkamp’s approach, Judge Posner rejected Apple’s 
argument for an injunction because it was “wild conjecture” that a company 
as large as Apple would suffer “loss of market share, brand recognition, or 
customer goodwill as a result of” patent infringement and because an 
injunction might harm consumers who could no longer buy Motorola’s 
products, even though they would prefer to do so.57 
C. IP INJURY AND HARD CASES 
In the areas where the insights of an innovation-centered approach 
have started to take hold, the consequences of the legal rules seem relatively 
 
 51. Id. This test requires a plaintiff to prove (1) “that it has suffered an irreparable injury,” 
(2) that money damages are inadequate, (3) that “the balance of hardships” favors an 
injunction, and (4) that an injunction would not disserve the public interest. Id. 
 52. See, e.g., z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 443–44 (E.D. Tex. 
2006) (refusing an injunction that could have removed Microsoft Windows and Office from the 
market, noting that “it is likely that any minor disruption to the distribution of the products in 
question . . . would have an effect on the public due to the public’s undisputed and enormous 
reliance on these products”). 
 53. See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 137 (2007). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., No. 1:11–cv–08540, 2012 WL 2376664 (N.D. Ill. June 
22, 2012). 
 56. Id. at *22–23. 
 57. Id. at *18, *20. Considerations of harm were also central to the dismissal of the 
damages claims. See id. at *6 (rejecting that a claim for nominal damages could save Apple’s suit 
from dismissal because nominal damages are merely “a symbolic recognition of a wrong that 
produced no harm”); id. at *7 (ruling that reasonable-royalty damages were not available 
because such “compensatory damages” are not available when there has been “no tangible 
injury”). 
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clear. For example, eBay, by eliminating the presumption in favor of an 
injunction, would seem to ensure that innovative products that lack 
substitutes will remain available to the public, even if the products infringe. 
While this rule would seem to provide the short-run benefit of protecting 
consumer choice, longer term effects on innovation are not always easy to 
definitively predict or measure, as Bohannan and Hovenkamp recognize (p. 
254).58 
Patentable subject matter under § 101 of the Patent Act is perhaps the 
most contentious area of modern patent law and exemplifies the difficulty in 
discerning innovation effects.59 The IP injury approach can no doubt 
provide useful guidance in some § 101 cases. For example, the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Bilski v. Kappos60 can be understood through the lens of 
IP injury. The specification of Bilski’s patent application described a method 
of hedging price-fluctuation risk in energy markets, but the application’s 
first claim recited a method of hedging “commodity” price-fluctuation risk.61 
Bilski did not invent this broad principle. At most, he invented the idea of 
applying known hedging principles to a particular field. Yet his patent would 
have preempted use of these principles in any field. Under the IP injury 
approach, Bilski could not have plausibly claimed that the foreseeable 
returns from his “invention” would have included the use of known hedging 
principles in all commodity markets. 
But the innovation consequences of judicial decisions become more 
complex outside the realm of abstract business-method patents. Take, for 
example, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Prometheus, which 
invalidated patents on a process that doctors could use to determine 
whether drug dosage levels were too high or too low for effective 
treatment.62 The patents (which had been licensed to Prometheus) claimed 
a method of (1) administering thiopurine to a person with a gastrointestinal 
disorder and (2) determining whether, based on observed levels of 
thiopurine metabolites in the person’s bloodstream, the dose was too small 
or too large for safe and effective treatment.63 The Court reasoned that the 
patents simply applied an unpatentable law of nature, the correlation 
 
 58. Cf. F. Scott Kieff, Removing Property from Intellectual Property and (Intended?) Pernicious 
Impacts on Innovation and Competition, 19 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 25, 41–43 (2011) (arguing that 
eBay overly reduces the negotiating leverage of patent holders, impairing “the deals needed to 
build small- and medium-sized business[es] that create new lines of business to compete against 
existing ones”). 
 59. The requirement of patentable subject matter stems from the language of § 101 that 
permits patents on “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or 
any new and useful improvement thereof,” subject to the other requirements of the Patent Act. 
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (emphasis added).  
 60. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
 61. Id. at 3223–24. 
 62. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).  
 63. Id. at 1295. 
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between metabolite levels and the likelihood that a dosage of thiopurine will 
be safe and effective.64 Although the claims instructed a particular audience 
(doctors) about a practical application of that natural law (to treat 
gastrointestinal disorders), that application was, in the Court’s view, a “well-
understood, routine, conventional activity” that did not, as a doctrinal 
matter, make the method patentable.65 
As a normative matter, however, the question Creation Without Restraint 
would pose in Prometheus is whether Mayo’s infringement diminishes returns 
that the inventor would have expected in developing the patented 
technology. On one hand, the patents in Prometheus, like the patent in Bilski, 
were broad. They seemed to claim all observations of a natural 
phenomenon, namely the biological correlation between thiopurine 
metabolite levels and patient health. The patentee in Prometheus did not 
invent this correlation, and the patents could hinder further improvements 
upon the basic principles claimed, such as the new (and infringing) test that 
Mayo had developed.66 On the other hand, personalized medicine is an 
emerging field. Broad patents like Prometheus’s might be necessary to 
incentivize initial commercialization efforts, and invalidating those patents 
might deter further innovation.67 
The Court in Prometheus actually acknowledged the question of 
innovation incentives. The Court noted its “concern that patent law not 
inhibit further discovery by improperly tying up the future use of laws of 
nature.”68 The Court even quoted Creation Without Restraint’s discussion of 
problematic process claims, noting that “[t]hey risk being applied to a wide 
range of situations that were not anticipated by the patentee.”69 However, 
rather than passing judgment, the Court concluded that the mere 
“presence” of “the basic underlying concern that these patents tie up too 
much future use of laws of nature” reinforced its holding that the process 
was not patentable.70 
In discussing the views of those who participate in the market for 
diagnostic testing (such as doctors, researchers, and sellers of diagnostic 
tests), the Court noted that Prometheus and several amici argued that 
invalidating patents like Prometheus’s would “interfere significantly with the 
ability of medical researchers to make valuable discoveries.”71 However, the 
 
 64. See id. at 1296–97. 
 65. Id. at 1298. 
 66. See id. at 1296. 
 67. Cf. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 
267–71 (1977) (developing the prospect theory of patents, under which the purpose of the 
patent system is to induce commercialization of as-yet-unrealized ideas). 
 68. Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1301. 
 69. Id. at 1302 (quoting p. 112) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 70. Id.  
 71. Id. at 1304. 
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Court also noted that several other amici contended that allowing patents 
like Prometheus’s would result in “a vast thicket of exclusive rights over the 
use of critical scientific data that must remain widely available if physicians 
are to provide sound medical care.”72 The Court did not take sides in this 
dispute over innovation effects.  Rather, the Court noted only that it “need 
not determine here whether, from a policy perspective, increased protection 
for discoveries of diagnostic laws of nature is desirable.”73 
The Court’s agnosticism should not be surprising. At this point, it is just 
not clear which approach provides stronger ex ante innovation incentives: 
patent exclusivity or free use of diagnostic methods as building blocks for 
further innovation. Moreover, the analysis of innovation incentives might 
differ among different industries, meaning that IP injury concerns may need 
to be articulated differently depending on the industry at issue.74 To their 
credit, Bohannan and Hovenkamp acknowledge the difficulty of 
constructing metrics and predictors of innovation (p. 242). As they 
colorfully note, “IP law is based on a series of hunches about such things as 
what types of markets and innovations require protection, or when we would 
be better off to let more market-centered approaches . . . control” (p. 15). 
None of this is to say that the IP injury requirement is flawed. But the 
unclear consequences in cases like Prometheus highlight the need to further 
refine the authors’ proposal to aid courts in solving vexing issues such as the 
permissible scope of patentable subject matter. 
II. IP INJURY AND INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE 
While patent courts might have difficulty measuring and predicting 
innovation effects, the institutional structure of the patent system could also 
present a barrier to adoption of the authors’ proposals for reform. 
Bohannan and Hovenkamp cogently explain how the movement toward a 
competition-protective antitrust regime took hold because of two related 
developments. First, increasingly sophisticated economic analyses created a 
consensus among scholars, judges, and policymakers that antitrust law 
should be reoriented to focus on protecting competition (pp. 37–38). And 
this consensus transferred into the case law because antitrust policy 
remained mostly free from special interest influence (p. 44).75 
These insights raise an important question for those seeking to refocus 
patent law on promoting innovation: Does the institutional structure of the 
 
 72. Id. at 1304–05 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 73. Id. at 1305. 
 74. Cf. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1155, 1156 (2002) (arguing that “patent law is technology-neutral in theory” but 
“technology-specific in application”). 
 75. But see D. Daniel Sokol, Antitrust, Institutions, and Merger Control, 17 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 1055, 1072–74 (2010) (discussing public-choice issues in the antitrust enforcement 
process). 
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patent system facilitate a judicial approach that explicitly focuses on 
innovation consequences? Although this question is too complex to 
definitively answer in this space, this Part provides an initial assessment of 
how institutional dynamics might affect Bohannan and Hovenkamp’s 
proposals. It first highlights the role that interest-group politics have played 
in creating the structure of the patent system. Then it considers whether the 
unique institution that arose from those politics, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit, would adopt any of the reforms proposed. This Part 
concludes by considering which institution, if not the nation’s expert patent 
court, might best effect the changes called for in Creation Without Restraint. 
A. INTEREST GROUPS AND THE STRUCTURE OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 
As noted, the substance of the IP laws has been heavily influenced by 
special interests. But special interests have also affected the structure of the 
IP system, most notably in the creation of the Federal Circuit in 1982.76 
Federal judges are mostly generalists; they usually do not specialize in 
any one area of law.77 Legal scholars and policymakers have sometimes been 
skeptical of courts, particularly appellate courts, with jurisdiction defined by 
case subject matter rather than by geography. Various fears fuel this 
skepticism. For example, judges of a so-called specialized court may be 
subject to interest-group capture, the judges might lose sight of the social 
values at stake in their decisions, the court might suffer from a lack of 
prestige of its judicial positions, and the “expert” judges on the appellate 
court might lack appropriate deference to trial judges.78 
Despite this skepticism, U.S. patent law is shaped by the only Article III 
court of appeals whose jurisdiction is defined by case subject matter and not 
geography. Why does patent law get special treatment? The legislative 
history of the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 (“FCIA”),79 the law 
that created the Federal Circuit, alludes to what Lawrence Baum has called 
the “neutral virtues” of specialization: efficiency, quality, and uniformity.80 
Committee reports on the Act suggest that the Federal Circuit was needed 
because patent cases were consuming too much of the regional circuits’ 
 
 76. For a more detailed discussion of the role of interest groups in the Federal Circuit’s 
creation, see Gugliuzza, supra note 18, at 1445–61.  
 77. See Diane P. Wood, Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 
Generalist Judges in a Specialized World, Speech Delivered at the Southern Methodist 
University School of Law (Feb. 11, 1997), in 50 SMU L. REV. 1755, 1755–56 (1997). But see 
Edward K. Cheng, The Myth of the Generalist Judge, 61 STAN. L. REV. 519, 526 (2008) (showing 
that judges on the federal circuit courts of appeals often “specialize” by writing many opinions 
in specific subject areas). 
 78. See PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET AL., JUSTICE ON APPEAL 168 (1976). 
 79. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25. 
 80. LAWRENCE BAUM, SPECIALIZING THE COURTS 32 (2011). 
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time, inexperienced generalist judges were rendering poor quality decisions, 
and patent law varied greatly among the circuits.81 
The possibility of appellate centralization in patent law had been 
explored frequently in the twentieth century, particularly in the 1960s and 
1970s as the caseloads of the federal appellate courts exploded.82 For 
example, in 1975, a notable congressional commission emphasized that 
forum shopping had become a “widespread” problem in patent cases due to 
the perception that some circuits were hostile to patent rights while others 
were not.83 The commission’s patent law consultants blamed this problem 
on the lack of an appellate institution to issue “nationally binding decisions” 
on patent law.84 Indeed, long before the caseload exploded, distinguished 
jurists such as Felix Frankfurter, Learned Hand, and Henry Friendly 
expressed skepticism about the ability of generalist judges to understand 
patent disputes.85 Yet none of these voices spurred institutional change. 
Why then did the Federal Circuit proposal gain traction? One reason 
may lie in the strong corporate support for the Federal Circuit.86 By the late 
1970s, business interests seem to have taken the view that greater certainty 
in patent litigation would simplify business planning and stimulate research 
and development.87 Perhaps as important was that a centralized patent 
court, especially one formed from the patent-friendly Court of Customs and 
Patent Appeals (“CCPA”), would be likely to uphold patents against validity 
challenges.88 The corresponding increase in the value of patent rights would 
benefit patent owners, particularly large corporations with extensive 
portfolios, and their patent lawyers. This explanation of the Federal Circuit’s 
creation is consistent with Professor Baum’s argument that the most 
 
 81. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 22–23 (1981).  
 82. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 72–73 tbl.3.6 
(1996) (showing courts of appeals’ caseload growth). 
 83. COMM’N ON REVISION OF THE FED. COURT APPELLATE SYS., STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL 
PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE, reprinted in 67 F.R.D. 195, 220 (1975). 
 84. Id.  
 85. See Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. v. United States, 320 U.S. 1, 60–61 (1943) (Frankfurter, 
J., dissenting); Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) (Hand, 
J.); HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 157 (1973). 
 86. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 22 (citing a poll conducted by the Industrial 
Research Institute, “a private, non-profit corporation with a membership of approximately 250 
industrial companies that account for a major portion of the industrial research and 
development conducted in the United States,” which “overwhelmingly” favored the creation of 
the Federal Circuit); 127 CONG. REC. 27,793–94 (1981) (listing corporate supporters of the 
FCIA, including Dow Chemical, Eli Lilly, Exxon, General Motors, Goodyear, IBM, Johnson & 
Johnson, Merck, Monsanto, 3M, Phillips Petroleum, Polaroid, Procter & Gamble, Shell Oil, 
Standard Oil, and Xerox). 
 87. See S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 6 (1981) (noting the testimony of the general patent counsel 
of General Electric, Harry F. Manbeck, Jr.). 
 88. See Lawrence Baum, Specializing the Federal Courts: Neutral Reforms or Efforts To Shape 
Judicial Policy?, 74 JUDICATURE 217, 223 (1991). 
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powerful driver for forming a specialized court is interest-group desire to 
influence the substance of judicial policy, and not the “neutral virtues” that 
permeate the political debate.89 It is also consistent with broader public-
choice literature suggesting that legislative reform can often be understood 
as self-interested behavior by a small, well-organized group, as corporate 
patent owners and their lawyers seemed to have been in the lead-up to the 
FCIA.90 
To be sure, the support of large businesses and their lawyers was not the 
sole stimulus for the Federal Circuit’s creation. The U.S. Department of 
Justice played a crucial role in rallying congressional support.91 The Federal 
Circuit’s creation may have also depended on the approval of the judges of 
the two courts that were being abolished, the CCPA and the Court of Claims, 
as well as the Judicial Conference of the United States.92 And the support of 
eminent scholars and notable federal judges was surely influential.93 
Even so, those most closely associated with the Federal Circuit’s creation 
acknowledged the importance of industry support. Daniel Meador, for 
example, noted that his staff at the Department of Justice “had organized 
the corporate patent counsel into an effective support group for the Federal 
Circuit.”94 At the final judicial conference of the CCPA, Chief Judge Howard 
Markey recognized representatives from Monsanto, DuPont, FMC 
Corporation, and Combustion Engineering Corporation as “contribut[ing] 
so much to what will be the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.”95 
Perhaps most telling is the title of a monograph published in 1982 by the 
National Chamber Foundation, a policy research group affiliated with the 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce: The Court American Business Wanted and Got: The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.96 
In Creation Without Restraint, Bohannan and Hovenkamp thoroughly 
explore how the substance of IP law (unlike antitrust law) has been deeply 
affected by interest-group politics (see, e.g., ch. 6). The potential interest-
 
 89. Id. at 217–19; accord JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 8, at 10.  
 90. See MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND 
APPLICATIONS IN LAW 50 (2009). But see Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of the Invisible 
Supreme Court, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 387, 399 (raising questions about “public choice theoretical 
predictions about the formation of the Federal Circuit”). 
 91. See generally Daniel J. Meador, Origin of the Federal Circuit: A Personal Account, 41 AM. U. 
L. REV. 581 (1992). 
 92. See Charles W. Adams, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: More than a National 
Patent Court, 49 MO. L. REV. 43, 63 (1984). 
 93. See 127 CONG. REC. 27,793 (1981). 
 94. Meador, supra note 91, at 610. 
 95. Hon. Howard T. Markey, Chief Judge, Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, 
Introductory Remarks at the Ninth Annual Judicial Conference of the U.S. Court of Customs 
and Patent Appeals, in 94 F.R.D. 350, 350 (1982). 
 96. FRANK P. CIHLAR, THE COURT AMERICAN BUSINESS WANTED AND GOT: THE UNITED 
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT (1982). 
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group influence in creating the structure of the patent system raises 
concerns about whether that structure affects the feasibility of the authors’ 
reform proposals. 
B. IP INJURY IN THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT? 
As those urging the creation of the Federal Circuit may have hoped, the 
court has been relatively protective of the validity of patents.97 The result of 
adopting many of Bohannan and Hovenkamp’s proposals, however, would 
be fewer patents being issued and a weakened bundle of accompanying 
rights. Thus, there are questions about whether the Federal Circuit, if given 
the opportunity to do so, would consider pushing patent law in the direction 
suggested by Bohannan and Hovenkamp. 
Even if the Federal Circuit were willing to pursue the normative aim of 
weakening patent rights and reducing the number and scope of patents, it is 
questionable whether the court would deploy the specific recommendation 
of an IP injury requirement in patent infringement cases. As noted, an IP 
injury analysis would require courts deciding infringement cases to consider 
the constitutional purpose of the patent laws: promoting incentives for 
innovation. Yet Federal Circuit judges have been peculiarly resistant to 
adopting a purposive approach to patent adjudication. Many of the court’s 
judges have publicly contended that patent policy is irrelevant to their 
work.98 
In an era in which federal judges must, as a seeming requirement of 
confirmation, claim to simply “call balls and strikes,” one cannot necessarily 
fault these judges for contending that their decisions merely apply the letter 
 
 97. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 336–37 (2003); John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical 
Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 251 (1998); see also Matthew D. 
Henry & John L. Turner, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s Impact on Patent Litigation, 35 
J. LEGAL STUD. 85, 90, 114 (2006) (noting that since the Federal Circuit was created, court 
decisions invalidating patents have significantly decreased, but the number of decisions finding 
infringement has stayed the same or decreased); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Patent Law, the Federal 
Circuit, and the Supreme Court: A Quiet Revolution, 11 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 2–3 (2003) (noting 
that the Federal Circuit has been relatively protective of patent validity, but has also narrowed 
the scope of infringement). 
 98. See, e.g., Paul Michel, Judicial Constellations: Guiding Principles as Navigational Aids, 54 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 757, 764–65 (2004) (rejecting the notion that the court should have a 
“discussion of philosophy”); S. Jay Plager & Lynne E. Pettigrew, Rethinking Patent Law’s 
Uniformity Principle: A Response to Nard and Duffy, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1735, 1737–38 (2007) 
(arguing that “the [Federal Circuit’s] function is not . . . to determine how well-tuned the 
[patent] statute is to . . . market conditions”); Alan D. Lourie, Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Fed. Circuit, A View from the Court, Address at the Fifth Annual Seton Hall Law and New 
Jersey Intellectual Property Law Association Fall Lecture Series (Oct. 23, 2007), in 75 PAT., 
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 22, 24 (2007) (“[N]ot once have we had a discussion as to 
what direction the law should take . . . . That is because we are not a policy-making body. We 
have just applied precedent as best we could determine it to the cases that have come before 
us.”). 
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of the law. But the Federal Circuit’s lack of concern for the consequences of 
decisions can be extreme.99 Moreover, those who call for more attention to 
patent policy are not asking the court to subvert the text of the Patent Act to 
the judges’ personal preferences. Rather, they want the court to appreciate 
the discretion built into the statute, just as courts have recognized the 
discretion built into the antitrust statutes, and to use that discretion to allow 
patent law to be flexibly applied to the varied needs of different innovating 
industries.100 
Another relevant concern in analyzing whether the Federal Circuit 
would adopt Bohannan and Hovenkamp’s proposals stems from not 
knowing what exactly motivates the decisions of federal appellate judges, 
who have the security of life tenure and a salary that cannot be reduced, in 
cases where the law provides no clear directive. The answer to this question 
is particularly mysterious in the Federal Circuit, where difficult cases do not 
necessarily have clear political consequences and the judges have practically 
no hope of the one promotion available to other judges—elevation to the 
Supreme Court.101 
Judge Posner has suggested that one important motivator for life-
tenured judges is prestige.102 A desire for prestige might be uniquely 
important to Federal Circuit judges, who toil on a court that remains a 
mystery to many practicing lawyers and might still be considered something 
of an experiment.103 To the extent Federal Circuit judges are interested in 
self-preservation, it might be in their interest to, if at all possible, enhance 
 
 99. See, e.g., In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“Congress did not intend 
for . . . practical implications to affect the determination of whether an invention satisfies the 
requirements [of the Patent Act]. They are public policy considerations which are more 
appropriately directed to Congress as the legislative branch of government, rather than this 
court as a judicial body responsible simply for interpreting and applying statutory law.”). 
 100. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 
1674 (2003). For examples of recent decisions embracing the discretion available under the 
antitrust statutes, see Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 881–82 
(2007) (overruling Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911), which 
held that it was per se illegal for a manufacturer to set the minimum price a distributor can 
charge for the manufacturer’s goods), and Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 
U.S. 28, 31 (2006) (rejecting the presumption that a patent on a tying product establishes the 
market power necessary to support an antitrust claim, abrogating older case law on the issue).  
 101. No Federal Circuit judge has ever been elevated to the Supreme Court, nor, to my 
knowledge, has any Federal Circuit judge been seriously considered for appointment. 
 102. Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else 
Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 13 (1993) (noting that “prestige is unquestionably an element of 
the judicial utility function”); see also LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION 
FOR BIG CASES IS CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS 20–24 (2005) (arguing that 
bankruptcy judges compete for the bankruptcy cases of large public companies because of, 
among other things, the power and celebrity that accompany the cases).  
 103. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Continuing Experiment in 
Specialization, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 769 (2004); John F. Duffy, Comment, Experiments After the 
Federal Circuit, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 803 (2004). 
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the prominence and economic importance of the patent system. At the risk 
of overgeneralizing, one might surmise that a large number of patents with a 
strong bundle of corresponding rights would make patent law important to 
business planning, elevate the importance of the Federal Circuit and its 
decisions, and cement the court as a permanent institution.104 
So, while Bohannan and Hovenkamp direct most of their proposals at 
the courts (p. 395), their primary target for patent law reform, the Federal 
Circuit, may not want to hear the message. For an innovation-centered 
approach to take hold, there must be an institutional audience that has 
incentives to seek change. If that institution is not the Federal Circuit, is 
there another body that might take the lead? 
C. THE AUDIENCE FOR CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT 
The executive branch significantly impacts judicially created antitrust 
law through the enforcement powers and amicus work of the Federal Trade 
Commission and the Department of Justice. The economics-based approach 
of those agencies has taken hold in the Supreme Court, which has 
consistently overruled pre-1970s antitrust decisions over the past thirty years 
(pp. 38–39).105 In comparison, the agency that administers the Patent Act, 
the PTO, lacks institutional strength. It has no authority to interpret the 
statutory requirements for patentability, and its actions do not receive the 
deference commonly afforded to other administrative agencies.106 Although 
the PTO frequently litigates in the Federal Circuit, often defending its 
decisions in appeals from patent denials, the limited available data suggests 
that the PTO is no more successful than the average litigant.107 In short, the 
 
 104. One might also think that the court’s increasing importance and permanence would 
make the court more attractive to potential appointees and more important to the President 
and senators involved in the confirmation process. The court is no doubt staffed with jurists 
who are quite capable. All of President Obama’s nominees to the court, for example, have been 
rated as “well qualified” by the American Bar Association. See Ratings for Judicial Nominees, AM. 
BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/committees/federal_judiciary/resources/ 
ratings_for_judicial_nominees.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2012). The obstacles discussed in this 
Review are not, in my view, related to intellectual or temperamental shortcomings of the 
individual judges on the court. Rather, they seem to stem from institutional pathologies unique 
to specialized courts. See Nard & Duffy, supra note 18, at 1622 (“[P]ersistent problems in 
institutions . . . are unlikely to be the fault of the individuals who serve the institution. . . . The 
fault is much more likely to be structural . . . .”). For a more detailed exploration of judicial 
incentives on specialized courts, see Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit as a Federal Court, 54 
WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2013). 
 105. The enforcement practices of the antitrust agencies have also changed during this 
period. See, e.g., Vivek Ghosal, Regime Shift in Antitrust Laws, Economics, and Enforcement, 7 J. 
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 733, 76771 (2011) (documenting the shift in enforcement practices 
by the Department of Justice away from civil actions and toward criminal cases). 
 106. See Tran, supra note 18, at 833–34. 
 107. According to statistics maintained by the Federal Circuit, the reversal rate for appeals 
from U.S. district courts over the past three years has been 14.7%. See Statistics, U.S. CT. APPEALS 
FOR FED. CIRCUIT, http://cafc.uscourts.gov/the-court/statistics.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2012) 
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PTO is unlikely to successfully advance the proposals recommended by 
Bohannan and Hovenkamp. 
As discussed, the antitrust revolution began in academic literature and 
later migrated into the antitrust agencies and the courts. Creation Without 
Restraint is emblematic of the call for patent reform in the academic 
literature. Although the PTO may be unable to implement the authors’ 
proposals, and the Federal Circuit may be unwilling to do so, there are other 
potential institutional audiences. For example, recent Supreme Court patent 
cases have overruled bright-line Federal Circuit rules in favor of standards 
that, in theory, could flexibly account for competition and innovation 
concerns in different industries.108 And some of the Justices’ patent opinions 
cite important academic work, such as Bohannan and Hovenkamp’s.109 But 
as Lee Petherbridge and David Schwartz have recently shown, the 
percentage of Supreme Court patent opinions citing legal scholarship 
(28.3%) is slightly lower than the overall percentage of cases citing legal 
scholarship (32.2%).110 Interestingly, however, the Court cites scholarship in 
an astounding 66.7% of its copyright cases, again illustrating potential 
openness to ideas posed in IP literature.111 
Of course, the Court’s failure to consistently cite patent scholarship 
does not mean the Court is unaware of that literature. In all events, the best 
way to keep the Court abreast of the problems and potential solutions 
discussed by this literature is through the briefs in its IP cases. The best 
audience for the thoughtful proposals in Creation Without Restraint might 
therefore be the Office of the Solicitor General. As John Duffy has shown, 
the Solicitor General has had enormous influence over the Supreme Court’s 
patent decisions throughout the last decade, with the Supreme Court 
adopting the Solicitor General’s views on the merits in all nine cases from 
the 1996 Term through the 2007 Term in which the Solicitor General 
challenged the Federal Circuit’s reasoning.112 
As shown in the Appendix, however, the Solicitor General has not 
enjoyed the same success in the past three Terms, losing two of the three 
cases in which the Solicitor General and the Federal Circuit clearly 
 
(click on annual data for “Appeals Filed, Terminated, and Pending”). For appeals from the 
PTO, the reversal rate has been 16.3%. Id.  
 108. See Kelly Casey Mullally, Legal (Un)certainty, Legal Process, and Patent Law, 43 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 1109, 1126–34 (2010). 
 109. See, e.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1302, 
1305 (2012); Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3253–54 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring); Lab. 
Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 139 (2006) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting).  
 110. Lee Petherbridge & David L. Schwartz, The End of an Epithet?, 49 HOUS. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 18–19) (on file with author). 
 111. Id.  
 112. John F. Duffy, The Federal Circuit in the Shadow of the Solicitor General, 78 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 518, 540–44 (2010).  
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disagreed. And in Prometheus, the Solicitor General unsuccessfully defended 
the Federal Circuit’s holding that the patent recited patentable subject 
matter.113 Still, it is fair to say that, in cases involving core issues of patent 
law, the Supreme Court has usually adopted the positions advanced by the 
Solicitor General. In the past decade, the Court has adopted the Solicitor 
General’s position on issues of patentability,114 infringement,115 remedies,116 
and standards of proof,117 among others. 
Of course, as Arti Rai notes, the Solicitor General has no special 
expertise in patent law; it “is a generalist actor that refines and arbitrates 
among the views of underlying agencies that have more specialized expertise 
in the legal questions at issue.”118 It is this position as a mediator that makes 
the Solicitor General particularly well-positioned to incorporate the insights 
of Creation Without Restraint. As the Solicitor General is formulating the 
position of the United States on patent law matters, it will consult not just 
with the PTO, but also antitrust lawyers and economists from the 
Department of Justice, as well as Civil Division lawyers, who defend the 
United States itself in infringement litigation. These discussions might also 
involve officials from the Federal Trade Commission and other interested 
agencies.119 These specialists are well-versed in the competition- and 
innovation-oriented perspectives that Bohannan and Hovenkamp emphasize 
and are in a position to incorporate those views into the position of the 
United States, as articulated by the Solicitor General. 
Moreover, in patent cases, the Solicitor General’s influence is important 
not only on the merits, but also in shaping the Court’s agenda. As Professor 
Duffy explains, from the 1994 Term through the 2007 Term, the Supreme 
Court followed the Solicitor General’s recommendation to either grant or 
deny certiorari in seventeen of the nineteen patent cases (89.5%) in which 
 
 113. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 8–11, 
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012) (No. 10-1150), 
2011 WL 4040414 (arguing that the patent claims recited patentable subject matter but were 
likely invalid for obviousness or lack of novelty). 
 114. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
 115. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002). 
 116. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
 117. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011). 
 118. Arti K. Rai, Essay, Patent Validity Across the Executive Branch: Ex Ante Foundations for Policy 
Development, 61 DUKE L.J. 1237, 1240 (2012). 
 119. See generally Elliott Karr, Independent Litigation Authority and Calls for the Views of the 
Solicitor General, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1080, 1087–88 (2009) (noting that “the Solicitor 
General must resolve competing claims made by different agencies of the government when 
deciding what position to take before the Supreme Court” and that “the Solicitor General is 
usually capable of being a neutral arbiter of opposing agencies’ views,” but questioning whether 
the Solicitor General prefers the views of the Department of Justice over the Federal Trade 
Commission); Seth P. Waxman, Defending Congress, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1073, 1077 (2001) 
(describing the process by which the Solicitor General obtains and evaluates the perspectives of 
various government bodies). 
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the Court called for the Solicitor General’s views.120 As shown in the 
Appendix, this trend has continued in the past five Terms, with the Court 
following the Solicitor General’s recommendation in four out of five patent 
cases in which it has sought the Solicitor General’s views. 
The Solicitor General’s particularly heavy influence in patent cases is 
clear not just from these numbers, but also from the substance of the issues 
the Court has considered, often at the Solicitor General’s urging. As noted, 
the Court in recent years has been willing to engage fundamental issues of 
patent law, such as patentable subject matter, nonobviousness, and 
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents,121 as well as crucial 
procedural issues in patent litigation, such as declaratory-judgment 
standing,122 the standard of proof for infringement,123 and remedies for 
patent holders.124 Similar future cases might permit the Solicitor General to 
argue, in line with the authors’ proposed IP injury requirement, that harm 
to innovation incentives is a definitional aspect of an infringement claim. 
For example, in an appropriate case, the Solicitor General might urge the 
Court to adopt Bohannan and Hovenkamp’s proposal to limit damages for 
infringement when the patent holder is unlikely to enter a market (p. 56). 
Such a holding would dramatically change the patent litigation system by 
limiting the damages recoverable by non-practicing entities. The Office of 
the Solicitor General may be the only entity with sufficient credibility to 
advance such a pathbreaking approach. 
CONCLUSION 
To be clear, the potential institutional barriers to reimagining patent 
law do not undermine the basic thesis of Creation Without Restraint: that there 
needs to be a closer nexus between IP law and its constitutional purpose. 
Although IP owners have had a louder voice in Congress than consumers of 
innovation (pp. 133–60), the consensus around stronger IP rights seems to 
 
 120. See Duffy, supra note 112, at 531. By comparison, from the 1998 Term through the 
2004 Term, the Court followed the Solicitor General’s recommendation in roughly 78.5% of 
all cases in which the Court called for the Solicitor General’s views. See David C. Thompson & 
Melanie F. Wachtell, An Empirical Analysis of Supreme Court Certiorari Petition Procedures: The Call 
for Response and the Call for the Views of the Solicitor General, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 237, 276 
(2009) (noting that the Court followed the Solicitor General’s recommendation to grant in 
eighteen of twenty-four cases (75.0%) and followed the recommendation to deny in forty-four 
of fifty-five cases (80.0%)); see also Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The 
Solicitor General’s Changing Role in Supreme Court Litigation, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1323, 1334 & n.51 
(2010) (citing additional sources calculating the rate at which the Court follows the Solicitor 
General’s recommendation on certiorari and noting that “the Court follows the Solicitor 
General’s recommendation to grant or deny in well over 75% of the cases”). 
 121. See supra notes 113–17 and accompanying text. 
 122. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007). 
 123. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011). 
 124. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
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be weakening. For example, while the recently passed America Invents Act125 
will likely not solve all of patent law’s problems,126 it increases the rights of 
third parties to challenge patents at the PTO,127 an important aspect of 
Bohannan and Hovenkamp’s roadmap for reform (p. 397). Also, the 
widespread opposition to the Stop Online Piracy Act128 and the PROTECT 
IP Act,129 better known by the acronyms SOPA and PIPA, resulted in a 
surprising legislative defeat for IP owners.130 
This Review has highlighted possible institutional obstacles to IP law 
reform, hoping to advance a conversation about how the authors’ 
thoughtful agenda might be further operationalized. Identifying institutions, 
like the Office of the Solicitor General, that are well-positioned to shape IP 
law in the way that Bohannan and Hovenkamp imagine may both resolve the 




 125. Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (to be 
codified in scattered sections of 28 and 35 U.S.C.).  
 126. See Sarah Tran, Patent Powers, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 595, 596 (2012) (noting that 
“leaders in the patent community have divided in their opinions about the Act”). 
 127. See Leahy–Smith America Invents Act § 6(d) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 321–329).  
 128. Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 129. Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual 
Property Act of 2011, S. 968, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 130. Jonathan Weisman, After an Online Firestorm, Congress Shelves Antipiracy Bills, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan 20, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/21/technology/senate-postpones-piracy-
vote.html. 
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APPENDIX 
SUPREME COURT PATENT CASES, OCTOBER TERMS 2008 THROUGH 2011131 
 



















v. SEB S.A.133 
2010 No   No 
Bd. of Trs. of 
the Leland 
Stanford Junior 
Univ. v. Roche 
Molecular Sys., 
Inc.134 
2010 Yes Yes CAFC Yes 
Microsoft Corp. 
v. i4i Ltd. 
P’ship135 










2011 Yes No Neither No 
Caraco Pharm. 
Labs., Ltd. v. 
Novo Nordisk 
A/S137 
2011 Yes Yes SG Yes 
Kappos v. 
Hyatt138 2011 Party Yes CAFC 
N/A 
(Petitioner) 
 SG: Solicitor General 
CAFC:  Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
CVSG:  Call for the Views of the Solicitor General  
 
 131. This chart is a continuation of Figure 8 from Duffy, supra note 112, at 539.  
 132.  Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
 133. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011). 
 134.  Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S. 
Ct. 2188 (2011). 
 135.  Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011). 
 136.  Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). 
 137.  Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 132 S. Ct. 1670 (2012). 
 138.  Kappos v. Hyatt, 132 S. Ct. 1690 (2012). 
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PATENT CASES INVOLVING SUPREME COURT CVSG ORDERS,  















Bd. of Trs. of 
the Leland 
Stanford Junior 
Univ. v. Roche 
Molecular Sys., 
Inc.140  





2010 CAFC Deny Denied   
Caraco Pharm. 
Labs., Ltd. v. 
Novo Nordisk 
A/S142 

















2011 CAFC Deny Granted   
 SG: Solicitor General 
 Rec.: Recommendation 
CAFC:  Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
 
 139. This chart is a continuation of Figure 5 from Duffy, id. at 531. While Professor Duffy’s 
original chart included patent-related antitrust cases, the Court did not call for the views of the 
Solicitor General in any patent-related antitrust cases from 2008 through 2011. See Briefs, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUST., http://www.justice.gov/osg/briefs/index.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2012). 
 140.  Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S. 
Ct. 2188 (2011). 
 141.  Applera Corp. v. Enzo Biochem, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 3020 (2011). 
 142.  Caraco, 132 S. Ct. 1670. 
 143.  Saint-Gobain Ceramics & Plastics, Inc. v. Siemens Med. Solutions USA, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 
2679 (2012). 
 144.  Bowman v. Monsanto Co., No. 11-796, 2012 WL 4748082 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2012). 
